How to cite this paper: Zhao, J., Wang, Y., Jin, P., & Yang, C. (2017 By studying listed companies, this paper investigates the effects of financial incentives and administrative incentives on the performance of managers in China's local state-owned enterprises and central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) respectively. We find that administrative incentives are more effective on managers of central SOEs, while financial incentives are more effective on those of local SOEs. We conclude that against the current background of mixed-ownership reform, we should realise the limitations of administrative incentives and broaden the role of financial ones. Moreover, we should find, for SOEs, the optimal incentive combination that is custom-made based on ownership type. In this way, incentive compatibility can be achieved and SOE performance will be enhanced.
INTRODUCTION
The critical issue of the ongoing SOE reform that started a few years ago is motivating SOE managers effectively. Particularly important is the questions whether the newly-introduced executive compensation cap 1 on managers of central SOEs will lead to a lack of incentives and whether the lack of incentives will result in low efficiency and talent outflow and, consequently, poor performance?
To answer those questions, it is imperative to obtain an in-depth understanding of the state enterprise system and the incentive mechanism of SOEs. Generally speaking, managers are given two types of incentives: financial incentive and administrative incentive. The former which promises bigger compensation package is the most widelyadopted type of incentive, while the latter offers private benefits of control to managers who usually have administrative powers as government officials do. Generally speaking, private benefits of control refer to the gains of exerting influence. It includes non-financial incentives, such as authority and prestige, and financial incentives, such as grey income and reimbursement for on-the-job consumption (Liu Ruiming, 2005) . However, in China, the term also includes higher social status and promotions. In light of this, for clarification purpose, a new term "administrative incentive" was coined to emphasise the unique circumstances in China. Commonly-seen administrative incentives in Chinese SOEs range from bigger administrative titles to higher positions in the Communist Party (Zhou Li 'an, 2004) .
Chinese SOEs are more closely linked to the government than their foreign counterparts. Under China's state-owned asset management system, managers of SOEs are given official titles. Moreover, outstanding managers will be offered a decent position in the government. Therefore, the administrative incentive has become an integral part of the incentive mechanism of SOEs in China, especially after the compensation cap introduced.
Given the unique situation in China and the ongoing mixed-ownership reform, satisfactory incentive effect cannot be achieved through the mindless adoption of existing incentives theories. To get optimal results, financial incentives, such as bigger compensation package and stock options, should by no means be our only tool in battling corporate poor performance. Administrative incentives should play a larger role. In light of this, a comparative study of the effects of financial incentives and administrative incentives will be a useful addition to the existing incentives theories.
In light of this, we decided to explore the effects of financial incentives and administrative incentives on different types of SOEs by analysing an enormous amount of public data about listed companies as well as examining the status quo of the existing incentive mechanism. First, we will review the critical literature on this subject matter. Then, we will propose two hypotheses based on our examination of Chinese SOEs. Next, we will select and review all data. What follows is an empirical study of the hypotheses. Finally, we will introduce our conclusion and put forward the optimal incentive mechanism for Chinese SOEs.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There has already been a significant amount of theoretical and empirical study on financial incentives. Coughlan et al. (1985) , Mehran(1995) , Hall et al. (1998) and Canarella et al. (2008) all explore, through different data samples, the correlation between managerial compensation and corporate performance. They all come to the similar conclusion that a positive correlation does exist between the two. Conyon et al. (2012) even go as far as to say that the pay-performance sensitivity of Chinese SOEs is higher.
As the market economy system matures and the internal and external governance mechanism improves, it is a belief held by the majority of Chinese scholars that the effect of financial incentives on corporate performance has become greater. In the 1990s, Zhang Weiying et al. (1995) Therefore, it is clear that the performanceboosting effects of both financial and administrative incentives aiming at SOE managers have been thoroughly researched from multiple angles. Some researchers have noticed a difference in the consequences of the two incentives, which provides valuable insights for our research into the optimal incentive measures for Chinese SOEs. However, few researchers looked at the effects of financial and administrative incentives on different types of SOEs individually. Therefore, there is still room for further research. Moreover, the previous research mostly only gave a qualitative diagnosis without adequate supporting data. For example, the study of Quan Xiaofeng et al. (2010) did conduct a quantitative analysis, but their data are old while insufficient, and SOE type is not a major focus of them. In addition, little research has been conducted using theoretical models. We strive to contribute to this aspect.
The previous research's data about SOEs' administrative incentives have been incomplete. To get an accurate and comprehensive picture, we not only gathered all the public data available by ploughing the Internet, annual reports and news articles but also personally verified and checked all of them. The large gathering of accurate data is one of the major strengths of our paper.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
Next, using a simple model, we will demonstrate how to achieve the optimal incentive effect while adopting both financial incentives and administrative incentives. This model is based on the linear principal-agent model introduced by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) .
We assume that the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (abbreviated as SASAC), the principle of our model, is free to adopt financial incentives and administrative incentives to motivate corporate managers (referred to as M) which are the agent. The incentive intensity is and respectively. Managers are assumed to be risk averse, so the utility function should be the one of constant absolute risk aversion, as follows:
where we assume that the managerial efforts will directly affect the outputs of SOEs and that the variable is unobservable. SASAC give incentives to managers under the linear incentive contract, as follows:
where: S is the fixed income of managers, the output SOEs produce, is the intensity of financial incentives, means the impact ownership type has on administrative incentives, and denotes the intensity of administrative incentives.
In addition, denotes the monetary equivalent of the effect administrative incentives produce.
The output of SOEs is:
e where, measures the marginal effect of managerial efforts on corporate output and factors outside SOEs. is normally distributed: N( ). The cost of managerial efforts takes the form:
where, the coefficient denotes marginal cost. Besides, we assume that C (e) C (e) . Applying equations (2) and (3) to the utility function of managers, one gets:
Managers' certainty equivalent is equal to the monetary equivalent of the managerial expectation, minus the risk cost:
Considering the participation constraint, we found that the certainty equivalent must exceed the maximum expected utility E managers will get without the contract.
The incentive compatibility of the optimal managerial efforts is: Therefore, the maximum expected utility, in this case, can be computed as follows:
Factoring in the IR constraints and the IC constraints above, the objective function becomes:
Adopt the optimal first-order method, we get:
Note that the variable an indicator of administrative incentives' effect, is absent in the equation about optimal managerial efforts. It means that when maximum profitability is achieved, the optimal managerial effort does not vary with corporate type. It is also clear from the above equations that administrative incentives and financial incentives are substitutes for each other. When one has to be reduced, SASAC can ensure optimal efforts by increasing the other's intensity. However, in reality, the intensity of administrative incentives ( ) has its limits because of constraining factors such as the administrative level of SOEs, regulations and range of impact. When administrative incentives are insufficient, SASAC tend to substitute them with their financial counterparts that are more market-oriented because their intensity is not affected by ownership type. In conclusion, to achieve incentive compatibility, it is essential to provide a variety of sensible and effective financial incentives to compensate for the underperforming administrative incentives.
The overall intensity of the incentives SASAC adopt takes the form:
which gives rise to three corollaries. The first corollary is which means that a rise in the efficiency of administrative incentives will lower the overall intensity 2 . The second corollary is and , demonstrating a positive correlation between the incentive intensity and the marginal effect of managerial efforts on corporate output. That is, the bigger the marginal effect, the higher the incentive intensity.
Nevertheless, another corollary which is and indicates a diminishing marginal effect, thus suggesting the existence of an optimal incentive intensity.
Our first hypothesis is that financial incentives are more effective on managers of local SOEs than those of central SOEs in improving corporate performance.
We put forward this hypothesis because we found that the ceiling effect of promotions was more severe in local SOEs, compared with central SOEs. Besides, managers of local SOEs gain fewer private benefits of control from administrative incentives, and they are less likely to get more because they are less likely to be transferred to central SOEs or central government. Consequently, they attach more importance to financial incentives. Given the positive correlation between managerial compensation and corporate performance demonstrated in Coughlan et al. (1985) and Mehran (1995) , we conclude that financial incentives are more effective on managers of local SOEs than those of central SOEs in improving corporate performance.
Our second hypothesis is that administrative incentives are more efficient on managers of central SOEs than those of local SOEs in improving performance.
This hypothesis is also based on a couple of observations we have made. Compared with local SOEs, the ceiling effect of central SOEs can barely be seen. The incentive effect of administrative incentives is greater in central SOEs because managers are more likely to be promoted within the company, to other SOEs or to the central government. Besides, administrative incentives come with a high number of private benefits of control and social resources. For instance, many executives of the five biggest banks in China are appointed to the main positions in municipal and provincial governments. Apart from non-monetary benefits like prestige and private benefits of control, in central SOEs administrative incentives also carry monetary benefits, such as grey income and reimbursement among others. In addition, the financial benefits will increase as one moves up the corporate ladder. Last but not least, the executive compensation cap increased the role of administrative incentives in central SOEs. These observations are confirmed by the discovery of Quan Xiaofeng (2010) that central SOE managers prefer invisible non-monetary gains and that higher positions carry more private benefits of control.
Next, we will present data that supports our theories.
DATA SELECTION AND SAMPLE FEATURES
On September 16th, 2009, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security along with five other ministries issued an executive compensation guideline regarding central state-owned enterprises, which placed greater restraints on managerial compensation. Therefore, to build our data sample, we collect information about all the companies listed between 2009 and 2014 on the A-shares market. For accurate results, we choose Chairmen of the board 3 to be our research objects. Meanwhile, we don't take into account certain companies: (a) financial institutions 4 , because their data are not representative; (b) ST and PT companies, because their unique financial situation; and (c) companies whose data are too incomplete to include. After the exclusion, we have a total of 4866 SOEs, among which 1602 are central SOEs, and 3264 are local SOEs. Our data are collected from CSMAR database and iFinD database. For more information, see Table 1 . 
Source: CSMAR and iFinD
The CSMAR database enumerated twelve reasons that managers leave their posts, including job transferring, retirement, end of the term, change of control, resignation, dismissal, illness, personal reason, corporate restructuring, legal involvement and end of the contract. However, we cannot discern whether the manager in question is promoted or demoted from simple descriptions like job transferring, resignation and personal reason. Therefore, to get a clear and accurate picture, we personally verify all the data through corporate annual reports, news coverage and information on the Internet.
It is evident from We also discover that the average compensation of local SOEs is 77,300 RMB per year, significantly higher than the 47,500 RMB of central SOEs. Besides, the average efficiency of local SOEs is also slightly higher. For more information, refer to Table 3 . 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Regression Analysis of the First Hypothesis
In our model, the explained variable is corporate performance. There are a variety of indexes for measuring organisational performance. Our study uses the accounting index because it is the one utilised by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. More specifically, we choose the return on assets (ROA) and return on investment (ROI) as our indicators because they tend to produce high-quality results. Both ROA and ROI measure the return on corporate assets, but the former looks at net return while the latter focuses on the earnings before interest and tax. The explanatory variable is the financial reward of Chairmen (REWARD) which refers to Chairmen's annual compensation.
Based on the previous study, namely Luo Hong (2008) Table 4 . To get accurate results, the data of the explained variables are from the present business cycle while those of the explanatory variables are from the following business cycle. In this way, we can reduce the effect of endogenous factors. We conduct separate regression analysis for each type of SOE. Regression equations 4 and 5 are based on the central SOEs:
Regression equations 6 and 7 are based on the local SOEs:
We find that in central SOES there is only a weak positive correlation between Chairmen's compensation and corporate performance no matter it is ROA or ROI that we measure. However, in local SOEs, the correlation is evident. In conclusion, the result of our regression analysis supports our hypothesis. We prove that financial incentives are very effective on managers of local SOEs but less so on those of central SOEs. The financial incentives are not very active in central SOEs for three reasons. Firstly, because of the compensation cap, central SOE managers earn a lot less than managers of private enterprises and foreign capital enterprises, reducing the effect of financial incentives in central SOEs. Secondly, the big private benefits of control (monetary gains and nonmonetary gains) can not only compensate for the low salary but also bring more sense of achievement and satisfaction than financial incentives do. Thirdly, so far there are no auxiliary financial incentives that are effective and market-oriented, such as stock options, thus, to an extent, making executive remuneration rigid under government control (Liu Xing 2012) . The reason why in local SOEs financial incentives are less than effective is that private benefits of control are limited because of the low administrative level of managers. Moreover, according to Quan Xiaofeng (2010), in the absence of effective censorship and supervision systems, managers of local SOEs usually decide their own salaries. Therefore, given the weak administrative incentives they receive, managers respond very well to financial incentives in local SOEs.
Regression Analysis of the Second Hypothesis
Corporate performance is still the explained variable in the regression analysis of the second hypothesis and measured by ROA and ROI. However, since some Chairmen have been on the jobs longer than others, in order to get an accurate conclusion, we decide to study the average performance of the SOE during the time the Chairman in question is in office instead of the company's performance on the whole.
Administrative incentives (Promotion) received by Chairmen is the explanatory variable in the analysis. It is the numbers of promotion the Chairmen receive on average throughout his or her time in office. It includes promotion as well as transferal to a government agency.
Control variables remain the same as in the analysis of the first hypothesis. For a definition of the variables, see Table 6 . Regression equations 8 and 9 below are linked to the central SOEs:
Regression equations 10 and 11 below are linked to the local SOEs:
We find that whether in terms of ROA or ROI, in central SOEs there is a strong positive correlation between administrative incentives and corporate performance. However, in local SOEs, the correlation is weak. 
CONCLUSION
Firstly, we elucidate, through a simple incentive model, that administrative incentives and financial incentives can compensate for each other when one of them is lacking. Then, we conduct a quantitative analysis of the separate effect of administrative incentives and financial incentives on local SOEs and central SOEs respectively, using the data of companies listed on the A-shares market between 2009 and 2014. We discover that administrative incentives are more efficient on managers of central SOEs, while financial incentives are more effective on those of local SOEs. We should create our incentive mechanism according to the ownership type of SOEs and the preference of managers so that we can achieve incentive compatibility, reduce costs, raise efficiency and facilitate the mixed-ownership reform.
In light of this, we put forward four suggestions:
1. Since the effect of administrative incentives is limited in both local SOEs and central SOEs, we should amplify the effect of administrative incentives as much as possible and in the meantime attach more importance to financial incentives.
2. In central SOEs, financial incentives should play a larger role, and a well-designed managerial compensation system should be established. In addition, listed companies should consider rewarding managers with stock options, which will promote the mixed-ownership reform.
3. In local SOEs, administrative incentive mechanism should be improved. For example, the promotion channel should be broadened so that managers can be promoted or transferred to central SOEs, other local SOEs or even the government.
4. Both central SOEs and local SOEs should differentiate between administrative positions and managerial positions according to managers' preferences and job descriptions. Then, select, appoint or contract managers accordingly.
Financial and administrative incentives have a different focus and achieve different results. The former offers material benefits and is widely adopted for all types of companies in today's economy, while the latter was created for the unique circumstances of the public sector. Though effective in motivating managers, administrative incentives have considerable limits and will eventually lead to managers' leaving.
For historical reasons, central SOEs, in reality, have many social functions besides being businesses and are subject to more government interference compared with local SOEs. In addition, the majority of the management are appointed by government officials. Consequently, promotion to government posts becomes a welcome substitute for monetary remuneration. Political promotion brings with it more power, more means and higher social status. However, it is a different story in local SOEs which receive less media attention, less government intervention, and in the meantime have a more flexible remuneration system. As a result, financial incentives are the major incentive measure adopted in local SOEs.
In this article, a couple of propositions are analysed and confirmed, using the latest data and backed by a sufficient amount of economic theories. However, what is lacking is an in-depth case study of one or several Chinese SOEs. For further research, a sampling survey followed by a case study should be conducted in order to explore how sound and flexible SOEs' internal governance is.
